A GPGME advisory went round my feeds on Friday: a double-free in the code that reads status lines back from gpg, triggered by a crafted OpenPGP key with…
A GPGME advisory went round my feeds on Friday: a double-free in the code that reads status lines back from gpg, triggered by a crafted OpenPGP key with a very long user ID. I'd always filed GPGME under "something mail clients use", which is true as far as it goes, but the advisory's own impact list was wider than that: Samba, most mail clients, and anything statically linked against an old copy.
My own boxes don't run any of those directly, but I run plenty of software that does, so I wanted to know one thing before I moved on: was I actually exposed right now, and if so, how far behind was the fix. I didn't try to reproduce the bug itself. Nothing here involves a crafted key or anything that would double as exploit code.
I only checked versions, read what the distro maintainers had already published, and tested that ordinary signing and verification still worked on the affected library. The advisory The GnuPG project's announcement (CVE-2026-129975, internal ID T8557) said versions of GPGME before 2.3.0 are affected, fixed in 2.3.1, discovered by Johan Carlsson and disclosed on 20 November 2026.
The bug is in two internal functions that read status lines and key listings from gpg: a buffer gets reallocated, the new pointer is only written back to the context at the end of the function, and an early return on a read error leaves the context holding a pointer to memory that's about to be freed a second time. Before doing anything else, I checked the one claim I could verify without running any code at all: the published checksum of the fix.
$ sha1sum gpgme-2.3.1.tar.bz2 1134a407b50204ee6fb9efaa6e1451c2460e543e gpgme-2.3.1.tar.bz2 That matches the advisory exactly. Whatever else I found, the actual fix on gnupg.org is the file it claims to be.
This is a source-linked briefing. Read the original report from Dev Community .