1981. December, in Morazán, El Salvador. Coined Operation Rescue, the Atlácatl Battalion, in joint-operation with greater Salvadoran military assets, honed in on a supposed insurgent Frente Farabundo Marti…

1981. December, in Morazán, El Salvador. Coined Operation Rescue, the Atlácatl Battalion, in joint-operation with greater Salvadoran military assets, honed in on a supposed insurgent Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberación Nacional (FMLN) encampment. By Dec. 9, the Atlácatl Battalion had enclosed a stretch of rural villages in the northeast. The Atlácatl Battalion came to unaligned El Mozote and surrounding hamlets. Lieutenant Colonel Domingo Monterrosa Barrios commanded the counterinsurgency; his talents for the craft had earned him head of the special force.

Monterrosa, in tow and in character, dug where the troop did. So, from Dec. 10 through 13, they committed a massacre El Salvador had never seen. A month later, Raymond Bonner, a New York Times Central America stringer, and Alma Guillermoprieto, a similarly-posed Washington Post correspondent, would reveal the massacre to an international audience. People, strewn as discarded toys, lifelessly propagated the Morazán grounds. The heaving hacks of machetes, voiced like the "cutting of banana trees," produced corpses as the fruits of the labor.

Heads dislodged as seeds. Bullets left their indelible stains, scattering the families and friends and people who composed El Mozote. It was, perhaps, no longer itself. But to the Salvadoran military, and to the United States, it was a farcical leftist guerrilla plot, by the FMLN, devised to demonize the government's counterinsurgency operations. Three senior Reagan Administration officials testified to Congress that 'no such evidence' of a massacre existed and that Salvadoran assets were improving their humanitarian record. Congress complied.

The Atlácatl Battalion was specially-trained - and armed - by the United States, with M-16s and tactics. Monterrosa attended the U.S.-ran (Military) School of the Americas, in Panama. In fact, and remaining unmentioned, U.S. Army Sergeant Major Allen Bruce Hazelwood had accompanied Monterrosa, in a helicopter, to Morazán and to the massacre. But the truth was out, for all to see. Didn't the United States have to play the journalists' game? As it unfolded: no.

To that end, the United States' mass media never truly threatened the state, and neither does it now, and we continually entertain an imaginary that it does. That it can. At the New York Times, Raymond Bonner was reassigned to business in New York, shortly thereafter. Alma Guillermoprieto was promoted at the Washington Post, but unexcitedly reported U.S. metro-area news. Above all, the Wall Street Journal published an influential editorial entitled "The Media's War," proclaiming a media-wide bias infesting reporting in El Salvador.

Source disclosure

This is a source-linked briefing. Read the original report from Johns Hopkins University .